Diplomacy and negotiation. Theory and practice in the framework of conflict
studies and international relations.
The is the art or practice of conducting international relations, as in
negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreements. According to Morgenthau it is
the quality of a nation's diplomacy which gives 'direction and weight' to other
elements of national power. Negotiation plays a focal role in dilomacy. The
course will explore diplomacy and negotiation, analyzing them in a wide range of
topics, from schools of thought to different ways of conceiving the role of
diplomacy and negotiation in times of conflicts and peace. Essentail to the
comprehnsion of diplomacy and negotiation is also the understanding of basic
principles of international relations, a discipline that is presented from the
point of view of approaches, from rationalism, to pluralism, to globalism, and
case studies.
The concep of conflict is also crucial to diplomacy and
negotiation, this is why in the course includes the notion of prevention, of
resolution and other with numerous examples, both historical and contemporary.
Trying to answer the questions related to the role of diplomacy and subsequntly
of negotiation, the course proposes the analysis of different circumstances,
such as when diplomacy is used to provoke war, to mobilise public support, to
help win a war, to avert war, to thwart attempts to avert war.
A continuous
reference to the post-cold war international system will always be made,
stressing upon the concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism in foreign
policy. Practical exercises such as role playing in situations in which the
students will practically experience aspects of diplomacy and negotiation, and a
final international crisis simulation will also be carried out during the
course.
Case studies prepared on both the Aceh and Kosovo negotiations by Harvard
Kennedy School and Harvard Business School will be used to educate Harvard
students in
diplomacy and negotiation.
Ahtisaari told an audience of faculty and students that at the outset of
each negotiation, he stated clearly to all sides what he thought the outcome
would be - and then he gave the parties wide scope to reach that outcome. He
also said he invoked his own values of fairness and justice to guide him rather
than worry about meeting some impossible standard of objectivity.
Ahtisaari was awarded the Great Negotiator Award on September 27, 2010
between two panel discussions that examined his role in developing a final
status for Kosovo between 2005 and 2008, and his mediation between rebels in the
Indonesian province of Aceh and the national government toward the Helsinki
Agreement in 2005.
The award was created a decade ago by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard
Law School, and was co-sponsored for the first time this year by the new Future
of Diplomacy Project in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
at Harvard Kennedy School.
Kennedy School Professor of Practice Nicholas Burns, faculty director of
the Future of Diplomacy Project, co-presented the award and moderated the Kosovo
panel. As US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 2005 to 2008,
Burns had been closely involved with the final status process. Burns said
Ahtisaari deftly coped not only with an intransigent Serbian government but with
fractious parties within Kosovo and complex dynamics involving the European
Union, the United States and Russia.
Harvard Business School Professor James Sebenius, an expert on negotiation
who is on the executive committee of the Program on Negotiation, moderated the
Aceh panel.
"In all the places I have been involved, in Namibia, in Aceh, in Kosovo, I
have known from the beginning what the outcome is going to be," Ahtisaari said.
"If you don't, and you don't make it clear where you are coming from, you can
waste the rest of your days."
The Group seeks to further develop research into Diplomacy and Negotiation
in the Department. It is also aimed at analysing, interpreting and understanding
the dynamics of foreign policy making in major, middle and small states.
The strategy for achieving these aims includes holding workshops, inviting
outside speakers to present current research, and encouraging publications. We
are especially keen to increase our recruitment of postgraduate students by
supporting new research initiatives in the area of diplomatic studies.
Prospective PhD students interested in any aspect of Diplomatic Studies and
Negotiation are encouraged to contact Professor Donna Lee (d.lee.3@bham.ac.uk)
in the Department of Political Science and International Studies.
When you begin a game you must first learn something about each of your
opponents. Sometimes you will know quite a bit to begin with, but you can also
ask people who know the opponent better than you do. You want to know if your
opponent is generally reliable or not, what his objective is, whether he is a
classical or romantic player, and whether or not he is good at negotiations,
strategy, and tactics. (This is a controversial point, insofar as some
players—usually the notoriously erratic and unreliable—say that a player’s
previous record should have no effect on the game. However, the more you know
about another player the better you’ll be able to predict his actions. It would
require a peculiar view of life for a player to knowingly ally with someone who
has never abided by an agreement in 20 games! Nor would you offer to draw with a
player who would “rather die than draw”.
However much some players wish to pretend that they are really government
leaders and that World War I is happening just this once, most Diplomacy players
recognize that it is primarily a somewhat abstract game of skill, and act
accordingly.)
Let’s consider each point you’re trying to learn about, beginning with
reliability. Novice players, urged on by the rulebook introduction, usually
believe that the winner will be the player who lies, cheats, and backstabs most
effectively. Perhaps if you never play more than once with the same people and
never acquire a reputation this would be true. But in the long run players learn
to treat liars and backstabbers as enemies. Why invite disaster in an already
difficult game?
Obviously, for one person to do well in a game with six others
some cooperation is necessary, and cooperation is easier and more effective
between those who can rely upon one another to some extent. An expert player
rarely lies, and then only because the lie is likely to radically improve his
position. He prefers to say nothing, to change the subject, to speak of
inconsequentials, rather than lie. When he agrees to an alliance of some kind he
usually abides by the agreement. By specifying a limited duration—until 190x or
until X country is eliminated or reduced to one supply center—he won’t back
himself into a corner which would require him to break one agreement or another.
When he backstabs (attacks an ally) he stabs to virtually destroy a country, not
merely to gain a few centers. The stab leads directly to accomplishing his goal,
not merely to increasing his supply center total. He wants to be known as a
reliable player because this will make other players more willing to cooperate
with him.
